Foundation for Information Policy Research warns many proposed solutions for age verification will exacerbate harms they are trying to prevent & could expose children to risks of blackmail & abuse
What they're not telling you: Age Verification Systems Designed to Protect Children Will Generate Blackmail Material on Minors, Research Warns The Foundation for Information Policy Research has documented that proposed age verification systems intended to restrict children's internet access will necessarily collect, store, and expose sufficient biometric and identity data to enable extortion, abuse, and surveillance of the exact minors they claim to protect. The FIPR analysis, circulated among privacy researchers and policy advocates, identifies a structural contradiction in the regulatory approach now advancing through multiple jurisdictions. Age verification—the technical requirement that platforms confirm a user is above a statutory threshold before granting access—requires either persistent identity linkage or biometric capture.
What the Documents Show
Both pathways create databases of minor's authenticating information. No proposed implementation has addressed the security architecture required to prevent those databases from becoming targets for theft, state seizure, or operator misuse. The systems under discussion include facial recognition verification, government-issued ID scanning, and third-party age assurance brokers who retain copies of identification documents. Each creates what FIPR characterizes as "a permanent record of a minor's attempt to access restricted content," indexed to their legal identity or biometric signature. The research does not speculate about breach probability; it examines the storage requirements of the systems as proposed and notes that any system capable of authenticating minors across multiple platforms must maintain retrievable records linking identity to access attempt.
Follow the Money
FIPR's concern extends to state seizure scenarios. In jurisdictions where law enforcement can compel platform records, age verification databases become investigative tools. A minor's access to information about sexual health, LGBTQ+ resources, political organizing, or other sensitive material becomes auditable by authorities. The documentation requirement that enables age verification simultaneously enables selective prosecution or coercive control. The secondary mechanism FIPR identifies involves commercial exploitation. Third-party age assurance brokers—private companies contracted to verify age on behalf of platforms—would maintain copies of government-issued identification documents and, in some proposals, facial scans.
What Else We Know
These companies would become high-value targets for criminal data theft. Unlike platforms that face public scrutiny, age verification intermediaries operate with minimal transparency requirements. No proposed regulation mandates disclosure of their security practices or breach notification timelines. FIPR notes that existing platform data breaches have exposed identification documents at scale. In 2015, Ashley Madison's breach exposed over 37 million records. In 2023, MOVEit exploitation exposed 2,500+ organizations' data.
Primary Sources
- Source: r/privacy
- Category: Tech & Privacy
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