What they're not telling you: # Twin brothers wipe 96 government databases minutes after being fired The U.S. government has admitted that two former contractors erased 96 separate federal databases within minutes of termination, exposing a critical vulnerability in how agencies manage access credentials for workers with systemic access to sensitive infrastructure. Brothers Muneeb and Sohaib Akhter, both 34, worked for a Washington, DC software firm that serviced 45 federal clients when they were summarily fired on February 18, 2025, via Microsoft Teams call.
# THE TAKE: The Database Purge Nobody's Asking the Right Questions About Two IT guys torch 96 government databases in minutes and suddenly we're treating this like a tech thriller? Wrong angle. The *real* story: How does anyone—fired or not—maintain access to 96 separate systems long enough to execute coordinated deletion? That's not a security breach. That's security theater with catastrophic failure written in. Either: 1) Government oversight committees are completely asleep 2) Termination protocols are fictional 3) Someone higher up needed plausible deniability The brothers are the fall guys. Nobody gets prosecuted for systematic negligence—they get prosecuted for the mess. Meanwhile, whoever designed this Jenga tower of vulnerability gets a promotion. **The documents will show contractor oversight was nonexistent.** They always do.
What the Documents Show
According to government records, within minutes of that termination meeting, the brothers executed a coordinated wipe of 96 databases containing U.S. government information. The speed and scope of the deletion suggests the brothers had prepared for this moment—that they anticipated their firing and had already planned the destruction. What remains unclear from available documentation is whether any backup systems existed, whether data was actually recoverable, and what specific information those 96 databases contained. This incident did not emerge from nowhere.
Follow the Money
Muneeb had been extracting and weaponizing credentials for months. In February 2025 alone, he requested plaintext passwords from his brother for individuals who filed complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Public Portal. Sohaib complied by querying the EEOC database directly, then handed over the credentials. Muneeb then used these stolen passwords to access private email accounts without authorization. But the brothers' ambitions extended far beyond their employer's systems. Muneeb had assembled 5,400 usernames and passwords scraped from his company's network, then wrote custom Python scripts—including one named "marriott_checker.py"—to test these credentials against external websites.
What Else We Know
The brothers successfully compromised hundreds of accounts across DocuSign and airline systems, stealing airline miles and booking personal travel with stolen benefits. The mainstream narrative frames this as a cautionary tale about bad actors slipping through background checks. Yet the story the government isn't emphasizing is the one revealed by the timeline: the brothers' criminal history was apparently unknown to their employer until February, despite both having served federal prison sentences in Virginia in 2015 for wire fraud and computer crimes. How did two felons with identical skill sets and a prior conspiracy conviction end up working at the same federal contractor, gaining access to 45 government agencies' databases? The answer suggests systemic gaps in vetting, credential management, and inter-agency information sharing. More troubling is what the case reveals about the fragility of federal data infrastructure.
Primary Sources
- Source: Hacker News
- Category: Government Secrets
- Cross-reference independently — don't take our word for it.
Disclosure: NewsAnarchist aggregates from public records, API feeds (Federal Register, CourtListener, MuckRock, Hacker News), and independent media. AI-assisted synthesis. Always verify primary sources linked above.