What they're not telling you: # The NSA's Bulk Collection Authorities Remain Active Two Decades After 9/11, With No Public Accounting of How Many Americans' Communications Were Intercepted ## SECTION 1: THE STORY The National Security Agency continues to operate surveillance authorities granted under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that were originally justified by the post-9/11 emergency, according to documents reviewed by the Project On Government Oversight. These authorities—which permit the NSA to collect communications transiting U.S. infrastructure without individualized warrants—have never been subject to comprehensive public accounting of their scope or targets.
What the Documents Show
The surveillance infrastructure built after 2001 operates through what NSA officials have characterized as "incidental" collection of American communications. The agency's documents describe this as collection that occurs "in the course of" targeting foreign communications, but the volume of such incidental collection remains classified. The NSA's inspector general has issued restricted reports on compliance failures within the program, but these reports have not been released to Congress in their entirety, according to POGO's analysis. This means the legislative body tasked with oversight lacks access to the complete picture of how the surveillance authorities it authorized are actually functioning. The Terrorist Surveillance Program—the warrantless wiretapping initiative that Edward Snowden exposed in 2013—operated under explicit authorization from officials including former Vice President Dick Cheney and former Attorney General John Ashcroft.
Follow the Money
After Snowden's disclosures, Congress passed the USA FREEDOM Act, which was framed as a reform measure. However, the law did not eliminate bulk collection authorities; it modified their administrative procedures. The NSA still operates collection programs under Section 702 that capture communications metadata—phone records, email headers, and routing information—on millions of Americans. The specific volume remains undisclosed. What mainstream reporting has consistently understated is that the surveillance authorities granted in 2001 were never actually repealed or fundamentally restructured. They were reorganized and reclassified.
What Else We Know
The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 made permanent what had been temporary emergency authorities. Successive administrations—both Republican and Democratic—have renewed these authorities without public disclosure of how many Americans' communications are actually processed, stored, or retained by the NSA. POGO's research indicates that declassified inspector general reports show the NSA has systematically failed to comply with its own minimization procedures designed to protect American communications. These compliance failures—including improper searches of the NSA database using American identifiers—have occurred repeatedly and often went unreported to Congress for extended periods. The pattern suggests institutional dysfunction rather than isolated misconduct. The officials responsible for authorizing and overseeing these programs have faced no criminal consequences, administrative discipline, or forced resignation.
The persistent security state is not a feature that arose from failure—it is a feature that arose from success. I find striking the simple fact that nobody with actual power has concluded this system should end. Not Congress, not the executive branch, not the courts that oversee it.
What this reveals is that surveillance infrastructure, once built, develops constituencies with institutional incentives to preserve it. The NSA's budget remains classified, but agency budgets historically expand after they succeed in defending their authorities. Contractors who build and maintain these systems benefit from indefinite renewal. Congressional committee members who receive classified briefings become invested in protecting the programs from public scrutiny. The classified reporting structure itself creates a barrier between public knowledge and institutional reality.
The beneficiary of the official narrative—that these programs are "reformed" and "constrained"—is not security. It is institutional power. The agencies that operate these systems, the elected officials who authorize them secretly, and the judicial processes that rubber-stamp them all benefit from a public that believes the problem has been addressed.
What readers must understand is this: demand the NSA inspector general's complete reports be released to Congress unredacted. Demand Congress hold public votes on Section 702 reauthorization. The current system exists because it is invisible. Visibility forces choice.
Primary Sources
- Source: Google News (Surveillance State)
- Category: Surveillance State
- Cross-reference independently — don't take our word for it.
Disclosure: NewsAnarchist aggregates from public records, API feeds (Federal Register, CourtListener, MuckRock, Hacker News), and independent media. AI-assisted synthesis. Always verify primary sources linked above.