What they're not telling you: # Twin Brothers Wipe 96 government-databases-minutes-after-being-fired.html" title="Twin brothers wipe 96 government databases minutes after being fired" style="color:#1a1a1a;text-decoration:underline;text-decoration-style:dotted;font-weight:500;">Government Databases Minutes After Being Fired The U.S. government has admitted that fired federal contractors with active system access can destroy massive quantities of sensitive data in minutes—a vulnerability that allowed two brothers to obliterate 96 databases housing government information before their credentials were revoked. On February 18, 2025, Muneeb and Sohaib Akhter, both 34, were fired from their Washington, DC employer during a Microsoft Teams meeting.
# THE TAKE: Government's Own Employees Are the Biggest Security Threat This isn't a cautionary tale about "bad actors." It's an indictment of catastrophic negligence at every administrative level. Ninety-six databases. Two guys. Minutes. Where were the access controls? The segregated permissions? The basic audit logs that should have triggered alarms? Nowhere, apparently—because federal IT infrastructure operates like it's 1997. These twins didn't need sophistication; they needed opportunity, and their own employer gift-wrapped it. The real story mainstream outlets won't touch: federal agencies continue hiring contractors and promoting insiders without implementing zero-trust architecture or endpoint monitoring. They've known about insider threats for *decades*. Yet here we are. This wasn't a hack. It was institutional malpractice with a scorned employee handing you the receipts. The government failed before these brothers pressed delete.
What the Documents Show
The brothers, who shared both a home in Virginia and a criminal history dating back to their 2015 wire fraud conviction, had been granted access to systems serving 45 federal clients. What the mainstream narrative frames as an isolated insider-threat incident actually reveals a systemic failure: the gap between when someone is fired and when their digital access is disabled. In this case, that gap was measured in minutes—enough time for comprehensive database destruction. The Akhters' pattern of unauthorized access was methodical and extensive. On February 1st, Muneeb requested a plaintext password from Sohaib for an individual who had filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Public Portal, which their employer maintained.
Follow the Money
Sohaib queried the EEOC database and provided the password. Muneeb then used it to access the victim's email without authorization. This wasn't opportunistic; Muneeb had been systematically harvesting 5,400 usernames and passwords from his company's network data and building custom Python scripts to test them against public services. He successfully compromised hundreds of accounts—DocuSign logins, airline systems, hotel chains—sometimes stealing airline miles to book personal travel. The brothers operated with the confidence of people who understood that detection mechanisms were reactive, not preventative. The most critical detail the mainstream press has underplayed: the employer discovered the criminal past in February but apparently allowed both brothers to retain full system access for weeks before terminating them.
What Else We Know
This wasn't a sudden discovery of misconduct that precipitated immediate firing. The company knew about the 2015 convictions. The decision to fire them via Teams meeting, rather than deactivating their credentials first, suggests either negligence or institutional failure to follow basic security protocols. The result was catastrophic—96 government databases wiped in minutes. This incident exposes a paradox in federal contracting. The government outsources critical infrastructure maintenance to private firms, which then employ people with prior criminal convictions in sensitive roles.
Primary Sources
- Source: Hacker News
- Category: Government Secrets
- Cross-reference independently — don't take our word for it.
Disclosure: NewsAnarchist aggregates from public records, API feeds (Federal Register, CourtListener, MuckRock, Hacker News), and independent media. AI-assisted synthesis. Always verify primary sources linked above.